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Abstract 
Geographies of the Body and the Histories of Photography 
Informed by feminist epistemologies, cultural theory and social history, the thesis takes 
as its primary focus discourses of gender and sexuality in the field of photographic 
culture. The accompanying contextualisation reflects the shifting theoretical and 
methodological terrain of visual cultural studies over the historical period in question 
(1983 - 2003). Earlier articles cover the project's initial development and subsequent 
essays navigate the work into a more historical context culminating in Seeing her Sex: 
Medical Archives and the Female Body (2002). 
This book draws forms the main body of the submission. It draws upon theories of 
feminism and sexual difference, the histories of mass-reproducible visual technologies 
and the philosophy of science in order to understand how human generation became 
female reproduction. Thus it places photography within a longer historical framework of 
visual technologies (engraving, lithography, stereoscopy, radiography and microscopy) 
that amalgamated to produce new kinds of objects and observers. It offers vertical 'deep' 
studies of particular historical images, and also more lateral, horizontal connections 
across disciplines. Its approach is therefore interdisciplinary and engages in an argument 
about the historical and geographical boundaries of knowledge, about what comes before 
and after and about what gets to lie inside and outside the discursive field of photography. 
This work examines and develops arguments that are always located in, but also move 
beyond, the archive. The essays included here re-think questions of visual representation 
and discursive formations in order to foreground the inter-connected relationships 
between institutional, cultural and embodied aspects of scholarship. 
Within the field of visual cultural studies the question of agency and the relationship 
between theories, histories and politics became urgent in the political climate of the 
1980s and 1990s. Increasingly questions of the subject's participation, cultural location 
and perspective in constructing any 'field' or 'terrain' became important and the 
relationship between experience and theory has consequently been re-thought. In the later 
publications the body is therefore discussed as both subject and object of visual 
knowledge. The work argues against an essentialist understanding of what any 'body' is, 
and for an understanding of the body in its material and historical corporeality, rather 
than its biological specificity. 
Understood as subjective and embodied, situated and partial, this more phenomeno-
logical, intersubjective approach to visual cultural studies acknowledges the sensory, 
emotional and imaginative dimensions of looking. Knowledge here is conceptualised not 
as possession, but as empathy. What we see as observers depends not only on where we 
stand but also on how we position ourselves within any given historical field. Moreover, 
this is a political question; not all perspectives are equal. 
This work has grown out of an antipathy to the disembodied approach of the humanities 
within which the human body had become alienated, suspect, denigrated. In its drive for 
fixed standards, the human sciences subordinated body to mind, emotion to reason thus 
foreclosing crucial sensory aspects of knowledge and creating an incapacity to 
acknowledge the wide diversity of our different modes of knowing. 
Historically, photography certainly does have an ignoble history as a technology of 
ethnographic domination and control (imperial, colonial, racial or sexual), but it is also, 
equally, a form of counter-memory. Images are a question of human rights and here 
visual cultural studies has a key role to play. 
Contextualisation: R. McGrath 
'History is Past Politics and Politics Present History' [Adams cited in Smith 1998: lID). 
'One can do very many important and valuable things without theory, such as talking 
and listening, loving and hating, fighting and making up ... but thinking is not among 
them' [White 1999: viii). 
1. PAST 
The Emergence of the Project 
This contextualisation has three parts: the first section, Past, provides an account of the 
content of the submission and traces the project's genesis within an institutional 
framework and political context. The second section, Past and Present, aims to situate 
the work within what I term 'visual cultural studies' , the outcome of changing 
theoretical, methodological and historical debates that have taken place over the last 
thirty years. Lastly, in section 3, Past, Present, Future. I conclude by discussing current 
developments, and possible directions in modes of interdisciplinary research and 
practice. The trajectory I trace is deliberate. I want to emphasise the inter-connectedness 
of material (institutional), symbolic (cultural) and sensual (embodied) aspects of 
scholarship. 
The PhD submission comprises essays, journal articles and a monograph. Informed by 
feminist epistemologies, cultural theory and social history, the work takes as its primary 
focus the discourses of sexuality in the field of photographic visual culture. The initial 
research for this project was presented in conference participation and publication (see 
accompanying CV) and reflects changing debates in both the theories and histories of 
photographic visual culture over the period in question (1983 - 2003). The earlier 
articles that are presented cover the project's initial development. The subsequent essays 
navigate the work into a more historical context culminating in Seeing her Sex: Medical 
Archives and the Female Body published in 2002. This book forms the main body of the 
submission. 
Seeing her Sex 
Seeing her Sex: Medical Archives and the Female Body, focuses on gender and visuality. 
The work represents a sustained historical, archival project, which takes developments in 
the period 1750--1910 as key to modem visual technologies and the framework within 
which photography emerges as science and art. This same period also marks the rise of 
biomedicine and of the reproductive female body as an object of medical scrutiny. 
Through an historical investigation of obstetric medicine's visual culture I aimed to show 
how such images have over·a relatively short period taken women, literally, out of the 
picture of human reproduction. The book traces this process of visualisation in order to 
place photography within a longer historical framework of visual technologies: 
engraving, lithography, stereoscopy, radiography and microscopy. which produced new 
kinds of observers [see Crary 1995]. It examines the ways in which historical images are 
absolutely crucial in understanding how the previously hidden. pre-modem subject of 
human generation has become the highly visible corporate science of post-industrial 
reproductive biotechnology. 
The ambition to bypass the female body in reproduction has a long history. From the late 
eighteenth century onwards the undefined, privately experienced interior of the womb 
becomes a space opened up to public scrutiny. Popular treatises, clinical anatomical 
atlases and, later, stereographic and radiographic manuals were produced. Such works 
are of primary importance in tracing the ways in which the modem female body. and the 
womb in particular, was increasingly visualised and subsequently reconfigured as the 
container for a collection of detachable and interchangeable parts. Female ova can now 
be 'harvested' from any female body and any uterus can be used to 'grow' any embryo 
manufactured in a laboratory. And while the part of the ovum outside the nucleus is 
essential for development (and therefore women are still necessary as providers), ova can 
now be enucleated and replaced with a cell nucleus (the part of the cell that contains 
'genetic information') from another person, male or female. The disappearance of the 
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maternal body in modem medical imaging is the result of much longer historical 
processes of visualisation, and of scientific and technological 'improvements' [McGrath 
2002]. 
Photography was one of the select scientific apparatuses of the nineteenth century. As 
Arago suggested in 1839, it would join the thennometer, barometer, hygrometer, 
telescope and microscope as one of the latest scientific instruments [See Eder 1972: 237]. 
However, these supposedly objective and consistent instruments, designed to check 
human error and augment vision (and other senses) have, in fact, diminished them. Less 
than a hundred years after photography's invention, Horkheimer described it thus: 'As 
their telescopes and microscopes, their tapes and radios become more sensitive, 
individuals become blinder, more hard of hearing, less responsive' [Horkheimer cited in 
MacDougall: 17]. We need reminding of this now. 
There are two main arguments presented in Seeing her Sex. Firstly, I argue that the 
history of photography must be conceptualised as part of a much broader, and 
historically longer, visual economy. This includes objects, drawings and prints, scientific 
instruments and human bodies. Secondly, I argue for an understanding of the female 
body in its historical corporeality rather than its biological specificity. While the body 
may well be a constant throughout history, understandings of what a body is, the 
practices, institutions, theories and images that emerge from those understandings, are 
not; they change over time. Consequently, as Joan Scott suggests, citing Jacques 
Ranciere, 'the alternative to the universalisation of difference must be the historicization 
of identity. If instead of asking how were women treated in some fonner time, we ask 
how and in what circumstances the difference of their sex came to matter in their 
treatment, then we have provided the basis for an analysis of "women" that is not a 
rediscovery of ourselves [See Scott 2001: 98, my emphasis]. I discuss questions of 
history and identity further in Section 2, pages 34-39. 
The work presented here, as I will show, has become increasingly interdisciplinary in its 
scope and aims not only to provide vertical 'deep' studies of particular historical objects, 
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but also to make more lateral, horizontal connections across disciplines. I adopt an 
interdisciplinary approach precisely in order to resist an anatomisation of knowledge. For 
writers such as Roland Barthes, interdisciplinarity is not a question of 'surrounding an 
already existing discipline with new methods, but of creating an object that belongs to no 
one' [Barthes cited in Clifford and Marcus: 1]. This has been one of the primary aims of 
feminism and the work presented here consequently draws on theories of feminism and 
sexual difference, the histories of mass-reproducible visual technologies and the 
philosophy of science. To use interdisciplinarity is to engage in an argument about both 
the historical and geographical boundaries of knowledge, about what comes before and 
after, and about what gets to lie inside and outside specific fields of discourse. Thus the 
outcome of interdiscplinarity is unlikely to be known in advance and cultural (as well as 
historical) analysis is, in any case, intrinsically incomplete [See Geertz cited in Renov 
1993: 30]. 
Montage 
Interdisciplinarity, I want to argue, has a visual kinship with modernist montage as a 
method that simultaneously acknowledges both connections and distinctions. Montage 
allows for re-arrangements and re-alignments; it enables us to shift images around and to 
produce differing sequences that can be spliced together. I want to emphasise the extent 
to which the approach to theory and history I present here draws upon this visual 
technique as a model for its methodology. Montage is not a jigsaw where there is only 
one predetermined arrangement. But neither are the arrangements entirely arbitrary. In 
montage the pieces never resolve into one image on a single, smooth surface; rather its 
aim is to produce a different, disjunctive image that makes us aware of contingency. 
Moreover in the face of globalisation, creating concrete connections across time, 
(historically) and space, (geographically), become important as a means of navigating a 
disassembled world in which rapid circulation and constant displacement are facts of life. 
There is no single, privileged point from which to look, or indeed to speak. Modernist 
montage employs the fragment as its theory; it opposes narrative. Such an approach has 
an affinity with photography as a quintessentially modem visual technology. 
Photographs, too, are fragments uprooted and disembedded from time and place. 
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Montage is therefore a theory of relationships. 'When making films', Alexander Kluge 
says, 'I am always confronted with the problem that whatever I see does not actually 
contain these relationships' [1981: 218]. As I argue in section 2, these relationships, like 
histories and identities, have to be made and the processes through which we make them 
matters. 
The Politi£s of the Polyte£hni£ System 
My approach is, in large part, a result of the situation in which the work emerged. The 
essays presented here, bits and pieces produced in the 1980s, appeared in marginal 
journals or in exhibition catalogues. I viewed my writing then as a form of critical, 
cultural activism. In that period it was a means of intervention; a way of straddling 
academic theory and political practice in order to emphasise the use-value of both theory 
and history as politically necessary. With the decline in these relatively cheap, critical, 
and crucially, publicly funded periodicals devoted specifically to photography, and the 
subsequent market expansion in academic publishing fuelled, in part, by the introduction 
of Research Assessment Exercises in the mid 1990s, the later works presented here have 
largely appeared as essays in academic journals or chapters in books. 
Recruited into the polytechnic system prior to its ideological conversion to that of the 
University in 1992, my first ten years of teaching and writing took place within 
institutions that were not constrained by the 'canon' of the University. From the late 
1960s onwards cow-ses had emerged that embraced photography, film and experimental 
video. These provided a space in which the boundaries between making visual work and 
doing theory could be actively challenged and this location informed my own critical 
practice. 
As I argue in 'Natural Magic and Science Fiction' [1996], these institutions have a 
particular history as the spaces in which the technical practices of photography and film 
had been taught since their inception. The Polytechnic Institution (which became The 
Regent Street Polytechnic and later The Polytechnic of Central London) opened its doors 
in 1838. By 1840 it was exhibiting daguerreotypes and a year later it opened a 
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commercial studio. It was also here on February 20, 1896 that the first moving picture 
was exhibited in Britain. 
In my essay I attempted to trace, historically and geographically, the epistemological 
foundations of photography and film as part of complex corporeal and social shifts in 
modernity. Through archival research I was able to uncover the fact that photography 
studios and film houses in central London came to inhabit spaces that had previously 
been the display rooms of anatomical museums. Such institutions fostered an appetite for 
exhibition and performance which was then welded to the promotion of new 
technologies. These were innovative institutions in which the boundaries between arts 
and sciences, instruction and entertainment (or amusement as it was then called), theory 
and practice had yet to be drawn. 
During the early period of industrialisation, mechanical inventions blurred the 
boundaries between the real and the artificial, the human and the mechanical, thus 
fostering a long held desire to enter into other sensory worlds. Such desires were 
signalled in the 1850s by the giant papier mache eye and ear that dominated the great hall 
of manufacture of the Regent Street Polytechnic. 'Natural Magic and Science Fiction', 
written in the 1990s, in a period of a so-called second technological revolution, was born 
out of a desire to comprehend historically the institutional and intellectual ground of the 
theatres in which I quite literally stood, day in day out, teaching students and learning 
from and with them. 
That history has to be placed within a wider understanding of the establishing of the 
Polytechnic system in England in the nineteenth century. The Polytechnic Institution in 
Regent Street was the first to open its doors in of t 838 and the system was expanded in 
England in the latter half of the nineteenth century. Polytechnics were designed 'to 
promote the industrial skill, general knowledge, health and well-being of young men and 
women belonging to the poorer classes' [Lawson and Silver 1973: 347]. Many of the 
Polytechnics went on to develop higher level technical and scientific work which brought 
them into association with the University of London [ibid.]. Polytechnics pre-date the 
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expansion of the universities in the nineteenth century (most of which were founded in 
the 1880s) and it is important to emphasise this history. Their development, and also that 
of evening and adult education, was part of the late nineteenth century belief in social 
justice. Writing at the turn of the century John Gorst suggested that "every boy or girl 
showing capacities above the average should be caught and given the best opportunities 
for developing these capacities' , but as Lawson and Silver state, he did not believe it 
right "to scatter broadcast a huge system of higher instruction for anyone who chooses to 
take advantage of it, however unfit to receive it' [1973: 340]. These debates seem 
pertinent in the present climate of rapid expansion. 
For many years the Cinderella of higher education, the Polytechnic had at its very heart 
the ideal of cultural and visual practice as both social and political, and when it was 
expanded after 1945 the Polytechnics became, once again, the sites of innovative 
programmes of study. In 1968, under the Labour government, The Council for National 
Academic Awards replaced The National Council for Technical Awards, and the 
Polytechnics began to award degrees. It was in this political climate that students on 
photography and film courses increasingly began to engage with a politics of visual 
practice. Any retrenchment behind the lines of individualism, creativity, high culture and 
art theory, on which much photographic theory and criticism had been predicated within 
fine art departments, was therefore resisted. In their place theories of ideology, 
subjectivity, sexuality were introduced. Within such critical practices questions of history 
and identity were central: new courses emerged and differing modes of pedagogy 
rejected aesthetic autonomy and facilitated an engagement with the social and political 
realities that shaped society [Simon and Giroux 1992: 13]. Here both students and staff 
actively worked to 'create the institutional, political and discursive conditions in which 
power and privilege were not merely exposed and eliminated but consciously rendered 
reciprocal and put to good use within the curriculum' [ibid.]. bell hooks reminds us that 
for writers like Paolo Freire, 'education can only be liberating when everyone claims 
knowledge as a field in which we all labor' [Freire cited in hooks 1994: 14]. 
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Central to what I viewed as a political project, I aimed from the start to make 
connections within and beyond the school walls and I taught across practice and theory, 
both within the academic institution and outwith, in evening classes and in schools and 
prisons. Precisely because the Polytechnic system existed outside the established 
disciplinary confines of the universities, it was a realm in which it was possible to 
develop a nascent politics of visual cultural studies and to define not only 'what it is to 
see, but what there is to see' and to raise questions about 'who is allowed to look' (and 
who is looked at) [Latour 1986: 10 and Rogoff 1998: 21]. Here visual culture and the 
wider social sphere, were understood not as opposites, but as inter-related, as part of our 
lived experience. Polytechnics sought to create a more democratic idea of knowledge, its 
application, use-value, worth and purpose despite (and in the face of) a relentless 
emphasis on its exchange-value. 
Feminism as a theory of difference 
My project was also informed by wider debates within the theories of feminism and 
sexual difference. Those debates necessarily acknowledged both the social construction 
and psychic formation of sexed SUbjectivity. As these debates unfolded through the70s, 
theories of sexual difference were vital in resisting the overdeterminations of 
marxist/socialist (with its emphasis on class) and radical feminism (with its emphasis on 
biology). With regard to the former, as Terry Lovell suggested, 'Marxism permits 
feminist history, but without necessarily permitting it to make a difference. While 
psychoanalysis', she argued, 'is every bit as male-centred as Marxism, because it 
theories sexual difference and sexed subjectivity, then feminist intervention here must 
make a difference' [1990: 25]. 
Marxist/socialist feminism and radical feminism shared a common ground in recognising 
that women were discriminated against on grounds of sex. Where they differed was on 
the causes of that oppression. Unlike marxist/socialist feminism where class was more 
fundamental than gender, in radical feminism, gender was more fundamental than class. 
The roots of women's oppression lay in biology, not in capitalism and the domination of 
women by men preceded any form of class society. Differences amongst women of class 
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or race for example, were repressed. Consequently, just as marxist/socialist feminism 
was a form of fundamentalism, radical feminism was a form of essentialism. Radical 
feminism was also weak in terms of history , for even if one accepts that biology is a 
constant, the institutions and practices that stem from that difference are historically 
contingent [See Scott 2001]. 
The route out of this double-bind was provided by psychoanalysis and its argument that 
femininity was neither socially constructed, nor biologically determined. The publication 
in 1974 of Juliet Mitchell's Psychoanalysis and Feminism was therefore timely. It had 
become apparent by then that women's liberation, or 'Valhalla' as Jan Grover called it, 
was not going to arrive, either in society at large or in enclaves, whether marxist or 
separatist [Grover 1989: 173]. As Laura Mulvey suggests, in the 70s, Marx needed Freud 
[1996:1 ]. But just as Marx needed Althusser, Freud needed Lacan. Unlike Freudian 
psychoanalysis, perceived as sexist since it appeared to rest upon a visible, biological 
difference, Lacan's materialist theory of sexed subjectivity and the unconscious was 
based upon structural linguistics as a system of difference [see Mitchell and Rose 1982]. 
Arguing that there can be meaning only through reference to other meaning, sexuality 
was re-conceptualised not as something added to the subject Gust as the sign's meaning 
is not some substance contained within the sign) but produced. Consequently, sexuality, 
like meaning, is neither intrinsic, nor essential. For Lacan, the unconscious, structured as 
a language, gives birth to desire. Desire, by very definition is unable to be fulfilled and 
so moves ceaselessly from object to object. SUbject positions, whether of masculinity or 
femininity, are fragile; they are precarious and tentative. They are not fixed and are open 
to both sexes, even if it is to a limited extent. The effort to collapse gender onto sex, to 
render subject positions stable and fixed through stereotyping, for example, is testament 
to such instability. Lacan' s supposedly non-essentialist and materialist theory of 
sexuality, attractive to sexual difference theorists, also came into question. While Lacan 
claimed that the phallus, a privileged signifier, or 'the signifier of signifiers' , was not to 
be confused with the penis because it merely represented symbolic power, the symbolic 
phallus seemed perilously close to the literal penis of Freudian theory. As Jane Gallop 
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put it, feminists found 'that central, transcendental phallus particularly hard to swallow' 
[1988: 125]. 
The productive outcome of these debates has meant that feminism has remained an open 
field, a decolonised territory. It has argued that 'critical strategies must be developed 
within a range of diversely occupied territories where the temptation to grant any single 
territory transcendent status is continually resisted' [Trinh cited in Borden (et al) 2001: 
12]. As an academic field feminism has never been confined to one discipline and, as a 
political movement, it has resisted the idea of a common, unchanging and shared 
experience amongst women. Instead feminism favours political alignments with specific 
aims. It is, both of necessity and from desire, a terrain ofinterdisciplinarity. 
Feminism has had to think across established fields, academic categories and levels of 
experience in order to understand women's oppression. As I suggest in Seeing her Sex, it 
has creatively re-thought 'the relationship between language and the body, discourse and 
experience, academic theory and political practice' [McGrath 2002: 8]. Feminism has 
refused to ignore the relations between these very different registers, as it·has refused to 
ignore differences amongst women. It aims to bring together life, labour and language, 
the stories of people, work and their lives. In this sense the work presented here is 
genealogical combining dominant, legitimate knowledge with what Foucault calls 
'disqualified, illegitimate knowledges' [Foucault] 977a: 83]. This non-institutionalised, 
unofficial knowledge is crucial to an understanding of genealogies as a politically 
informed counter-memory (see page 17 for a further discussion of genealogy). Feminism 
has argued for a different understanding of what constitutes knowledge and has had to 
struggle hard to articulate the relationship between differing forms of knowing in order 
to resist both a totalising theoretical imperialism and a naive political practice. 
Feminism, I argue, must be understood as a politics committed to making a difference, to 
overcoming relations of domination. It has therefore linked the oppression of women to 
the oppression of others and provided a trenchant critique of the price that is paid for 
separating public from private, mind from body and sex from gender [see Flax 1993: 
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11]]. Moreover, sexual difference must, of necessity, be both attentive to, and able to 
theorise other differences. The sexual is only one such difference within much wider 
powerful interlocking systems of oppression and subjugation. Race, gender and class 
were, from the start, as Haraway suggests, 'dangerous rickety machines for guarding the 
chief fictions and powers of European civil manhood. To be unmanly is to be uncivil, to 
be dark is to be unruly. These metaphors mattered enormously in the constitution of what 
counts as knowledge' [2000: 30]. 
The contention of feminist epistemology is not simply that patriarchal capitalism has 
trapped women in all too narrow definitions of what it means to be female. but has 
trapped us all, men and women, within too narrow definitions of what it means to be 
human. It has therefore refused to fall back on an essentialist, universal, humanist ideal 
of subjectivity and instead has sought to develop more adequate theories of human 
cultural diversity. As I argue in Seeing her Sex, 'within an anti-essentialist feminist 
politics, ontology can never be separated from epistemology. This is in itself is a form of 
essentialism. Feminism has had to think hard about the intricate and necessary 
relationship of life, thought and experience that cuts across comfortable intellectual 
categories and has suggested very different ways of thinking about how knowledge is 
produced and organised, and about what knowledge does to the objects it thereby 
produces; this necessarily includes ourselves' [McGrath 2002: 8). 
Increasingly, within the Academy, feminism has moved from without to incorporation 
within disciplines it fought hard to resist. Yet, these disciplines have been transformed by 
feminist intervention. The challenge now is whether it can continue to transform them. 
Marginality, after all, did not guarantee anything; but nor, necessarily, does 
incorporation. As I argue in Seeing her Sex, although repressed within narratives of 
modernity, sexual difference lies at the heart of enlightenment thought [McGrath 2002: 
1]. Joan Scott eloquently frames the paradox thus: 'would there be feminism without the 
discourse of individual rights that repress sexual difference? I think not. Can there be a 
feminist politics that exploits that tension without expecting fina1Jy to resolve it. I think 
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so' [1996: 175]. As I argue, such tensions have been vital to the liveliness of feminist 
theory. 
Bodies, Art and Photography 
It is within this institutional and theoretical context that my work emerged. Two main 
areas of investigation move between canonical fine art and popular or unknown images. 
First, there is an engagement with pedagogy and visual curricula and earlier articles dealt 
with the politics of photography as represented within the museum, the art gallery and 
the education system. This polemical work aimed to deconstruct an outmoded and 
longstanding gendered fascination with authorship, genius, self-referentiality and the 
fundamentally fetishistic and auratic approach to photographic history as the history of 
an art or as a completely dehistoricised celebration of technology. ('Is the future of 
Photographic Education Female' [1989], and • A Museum for our times: The Kodak 
Wing at the National Museum of Film, Photography and Television' [1990]). 
Other essays examined critically the inadequacy of hagiographic, art historical 
approaches to understanding photographs and sought to turn the lens away from prized 
aesthetic objects produced by master photographers. Instead, I emphasised the subjective 
and sexual politics of looking, as well as the relationship between the technical and the 
aesthetic in the production and consumption of images. (' Re- reading Edward Weston' 
[1987], 'Looking Hard: the male body' [1988], and 'Surplus Bodies: the real, the virtual 
and the work of Witkin' [1997]). For example my aim in 'Looking Hard' was to examine 
the popular male nude, produced for a homosexual audience, from a feminist 
perspective. In 'Re-reading Edward Weston', I discussed the example of the fine art 
female nude and the politics of the male (heterosexual) gaze by employing feminist and 
psychoanalytic theories. The article, 'Surplus Bodies', developed these ideas further 
within the context of electronic imaging and fine art photographic practice, arguing that 
as medical imaging has become smarter, more abstract, clean and less meaty, 
photography has become more literal, more visceral. The 'waning of affect' has led to an 
increase in the demand for butchered bodies and strong meat, as long as it is well hung 
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within the gallery [see Jameson 1984: 53-92]. These articles considered, from different 
perspectives, the observer's body, whether photographer or viewer, in relation /0 the 
body imaged. 
The second strand of writing, ('Medical Police' [1984], 'Dangerous Liaisons' [1990], 
'Deviance and Difference' [1993] and Seeing her Sex [2002]) runs parallel with (and 
develops from) the previous essays. It represents the flip-side of the fine print, and of the 
gallery and academy. This work is drawn from ignoble archives. Such images represent 
the dark underside of civilisation that in large part makes up the photographic archive. In 
Benjamin's terms 'There is no cultural document that is not at the same time a record of 
barbarism' [1979: 359-360]. Such images are the 'other' of documents of civilisation, 
the records of barbarism that emerge within modem disciplinary institutions. From its 
inception, photography was pressed into service, not only producing honorific portraits, 
but in mapping a rapidly expanding underclass. Those who had remained beneath the 
threshold of vision were brought into view only to be consigned to the archive in what 
was an act of representational liquidation. However, the very existence of such archives 
means that they can become resources for producing counter-histories. I, have argued that 
it is these anonymous and vast sites of evidence, previously inadmissible, that must be 
brought into the frame of photography's history. 
Art history privileges certain locations, geographies and histories at the expense of 
others. My work did not fit easily into its disciplinary structure, nor did the discourse of 
visual cultural studies fully exist. With hindsight my aim here was, in Rogoff swords, 
'to repopulate space with all the obstacles and all the unknown images which the illusion 
of transparency evacuated from it' [1998: 22]. Rogoff emphasises the way in which 
space (and I include here art historical space) 'is always differentiated, it is always sexual 
or racial; it is always constituted out of circulating capital' [ibid.]. Obstacles are designed 
to get in the way; they interrupt our view and we have to negotiate them; they do not 
negotiate us. The images under discussion here are those that are excluded when 
photography is viewed as simply, or only, a sub-discipline of art history. Moreover, it is 
crucial to 'make visible all those things that have been lost in an object; not in order to 
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make the other meanings disappear, but rather to make it impossible for the bottom line 
to be a single statement' [Haraway 2000: 105, my emphasis]. 
Bodies, Medicine and Photography 
Broadly then, this part of the work takes as its focus the abject body. Here I looked to 
medicine for primarily two reasons. First medicine had a significant role in the early 
development and application of photography. Many early photographers were doctors 
who saw the potential of the new medium's application in promoting scientific medicine. 
Secondly, medical photography was, and remains, an under-researched archival visual 
resource. In this work I therefore sought to raise questions about the underbelly of art 
history, about what could not be spoken about, and had therefore been excluded from the 
discourse of photography as an art. This work ran parallel with developing feminist 
theories of the gaze which had begun to shift its view downwards, away from the 
fetishised female body, in order to address abject images, which, for historical reasons as 
well as by cultural convention had remained beneath the threshold of vision. Unseen, 
hidden away in the depths of the archive, such images have continued to exert, albeit 
often unconsciously, considerable power on how we think about and differentiate bodies. 
The historian Laborde, writing in second empire France, distinguishes between the 
library and the archive: 'a library is something, archives are someone' [Laborde cited in 
Smith 1998: 116]. Archives are the repositories of human life. 
A number of essays (,Medical Police', 'Dangerous Liaisons', 'Deviance and Difference') 
therefore address both historical and contemporary images by examining the body within 
medicine and health education. 'Medical Police' sought to bring back into the history of 
photography the use of the medium within the newly established hospitals of the 
nineteenth century. My argument in this essay was that we should consider both the 
images that we look at and the framework in which we consider them. Visualisation 
played a fundamental role in distinguishing between what was conceptualised as nonnal 
and pathological. Such images have been central to narrowing the definitions of what it 
means to be human. 
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'Dangerous Liaisons' was a specific analysis of the Health Education Authority's 
advertising campaign on HIV and AIDS prevention in the late 1980s. Here, I argued that 
this campaign pathologised gay men, single women and drug users. Such work was part 
of a wider feminist theoretical imperative and political intervention to be both attentive 
to, and theorise, other differences. As I argue above, 'the sexual is only one such 
difference within much wider, powerful interlocking systems of oppression and 
subordination' [see page 11]. A subsequent essay, 'Deviance and Difference' written 
several years later, examined gay subcultural and political activist responses to State 
advertising campaigns that emerged in the intervening years. This offered an example of 
Foucauldian reverse-discourse in order to raise awareness of HI V and AIDS amongst a 
peer group. More generally such projects raised important political about the inequalities 
in health care provision when entire social groups are perceived as deviant and hence 
dispensable. 
In both these essays I attempted to examine how the contemporary representation of the 
diseases of HIV and AIDS drew upon an already existing historical reservoir of images. 
This strategy ensures that older (particularly nineteenth century) residual ideologies of 
deviant sexuality, and of sexually transmitted diseases (which are patently unscientific, 
from the perspective of the present) can be re-mobilised within a contemporary medico-
scientific framework. 
I developed this idea further in Seeing her Sex, drawing upon Bruno Latour's concept of 
the 'immutable mobile'. The value of Latour's concept of the immutable mobile lies in 
its ability to account for the ways in which representations appear to change while 
simultaneously ensuring some continuity with older images. For Latour it is the 'clever 
alignment of immutable mobiles' that produces 'the circulating reference' [1999: 306-7]. 
By this Latour means that the aim is simultaneously to accelerate mobility and enhance 
the immutability of images [1986: 10]. Woman is one such circulating reference. and 
'scientific' photographs of women' s bodies, I have argued, can therefore only be 
understood within a far longer historical trajectory of print culture that incorporates 
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already existing perspectives into the highly mobile and rapidly circulating medium of 
photography. Thus, while the medical archival photographs of women' s bodies which 
formed the basis for Seeing her Sex appear as seamless, self-evident and transparent, they 
are complexly constructed images that draw on already existing visual archives rather 
than upon recourse to transparent, external reality. Photographs are the discursive 
outcomes of very specific regimes of knowledge. Speaking of scientists, Latour makes 
the more generally applicable point that they only 'start seeing something once they stop 
looking at nature and look exclusively and obsessively at prints and flat inscriptions. In 
the debates around perception, what is always forgotten is this simple drift from 
watching confusing three-dimensional objects, to inspecting two-dimensional images 
which have been made less confusing' [Latour 1986: 16]. 
At the heart of these latter publications is the question of the body as both subject and 
object of knowledge. This is a body that is historically positioned by discourse, and at the 
same time, a body which must position itself, here and now, within discourse. Moreover, 
as I argue in Seeing her Sex, this is not simply 'the' body, whether male or female. black 
or white, hetero- or homosexual. Rather, I argue against an essentialist understanding of 
what any • body , is, and for an understanding of the body in its material and historical 
corporeality, rather than its biological specificity. Biology is of course a discourse that 
emerges at a specific historical moment in the nineteenth century. In short, what a body 
is depends upon how it is discursively produced. 
This part of the project was driven by feminist politics and post-structuralist theory 
within which questions of subjectivity, sexuality and difference have been central. Post-
structuralism has been particularly important to feminism because both share in common 
a critique of the political and epistemological outcomes of Cartesian thought. Post-
structuralism and feminism make us aware that the question is not only that of the 
'political economy of bodies, but the libidinal economy of politics' [Ziarek 2001: 219]. 
This has had important implications for an embodied concept of subjectivity [see Section 
3, pages 40 - 53]. Psychoanalysis as a theory of the formation of sUbjectivity through 
sexuality and the unconscious plays a fundamental role here. 
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Feminist genealogy: Bodies and Histories 
Such work is, in Foucault's tenninology, genealogical. Genealogies oppose the search 
for "origins" and instead trace lineages of dissent [Foucault 1977b: 140]. For Foucault, 
'what is found at the historical beginning of things is not the inviolable identity of their 
origin; it is the dimension of other things. It is disparity' [ibid.: 142]. Not a body, but 
bodies understood as the 'inscribed surface of events (traced by language and dissolved 
by ideas) the locus of a disassociated Self (adopting the illusion of a substantial unity), 
and a volume in perpetual disintegration' [ibid.: 148]. 
Foucault argues that there are no origins or, indeed. continuities, whether of ourselves or 
history. Genealogy, he contends, is history at its most effective. Effective history differs 
from traditional history in being without constants. Moreover, as Foucault makes clear, 
'nothing in man - not even his body - is sufficiently stable to serve as the basis for self-
recognition or for understanding other men' [1977b: 153]. Foucault explicitly 
acknowledges the 'corporeal roots of subjectivity and the non-coincidence of the subject 
with hislher consciousness' [Braidotti 1994: 59]. He suggests that we are· not coherent 
subjects detached from the objects we study and '[H]istory becomes "effective" to the 
degree that it introduces discontinuity into our very being - as it divides our emotions, 
dramatises our instincts, multiplies our body and sets it against ourselves' [ibid.: 154]. 
Thus, there is no singular body, and consequently, as I argue in Seeing her Sex, '''The'' 
body is not the new holy grail of visual cultural studies' [McGrath 2002: 7]. 
For Foucault, genealogies are situated 'within the articulation of the body and history' 
[1997b: 148]. It is this that interests me and the task at hand is 'to expose a body totally 
imprinted by history and the process of history's destruction of the body' [ibid.]. Thus: 
'Effective history can also invert the relationship that traditional 
history, in its dependence on metaphysics, establishes between 
proximity and distance. The latter is given to a contemplation of 
distances and heights: the noblest periods, the highest forms, the 
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most abstract ideas, the purest individualities ... effective history 
shortens its vision to those things nearest to it - the body, the 
nervous system, nutrition, digestion, and energies; it unearths the 
periods of decadence and if it chances upon lofty epochs, it is with 
suspicion - not vindictive but joyous - of finding a barbarous and 
shameful confusion ... it reverses the surreptitious practice of 
historians, the pretension to examine things furthest from 
themselves, the grovelling manner in which they approach this 
promising distance .... Effective history studies what is closest, but 
in an abrupt dispossession, so as to seize it at a distance' [ibid.: 
153-156]. 
Foucault emphasises the very instability and implication of the subject in constructing 
any field of knowledge and unsettling our ideas about what we might or should be 
looking at or for. He suggests that it is not a question of replacing one viewpoint with 
another, seen from nearer at hand, but of simultaneously moving further back in order to 
disturb what might be described as correct distance, a stabilising position: Such a locus 
ensures that the object is neither too far away to be dangerously remote, nor so close as 
to render it overwhelming. Genealogy disturbs this configuration. 
Foucault employs an approach that suggests the use of both optics and haptics (I discuss 
these terms in section 3, pages 41 - 42). He suggests that we can and must have both a 
measure of analytic distance and be closely engaged. Increasingly within theoretical 
debates questions of the subject's participation, cultural location and perspective in 
constructing any 'field' or 'terrain' have become important (note that the metaphors are 
geographical). Vision is now understood as subjective and embodied, situated and 
partial. What we see depends not just on where we stand but also on how we then 
position ourselves within any given field. What we find to see will depend on what we 
are looking for. Moreover, this is a political question; not all perspectives are equal. 
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Feminist cultural historians, amongst others, have argued that there can be neither news, 
nor views, from nowhere [See Scott 1996; Haraway 1997]. All knowledge is situated 
and begins at ground level. In my work I have argued (figuratively) against simply 
'looking down', and in favour of a mode of knowing that does not privilege mind over 
matter. The heady atmosphere, the 'up here' of Cartesian thought with its other, a base 
'down there' or dark continent of brute matter, with all its racial and sexual resonance, 
only makes sense from the elevated monocular and detached perspective of 
Enlightenment thought. It is not the only way of looking at, or being in the world. What 
I propose in my work are diverse, different knowledges that are more firmly grounded, 
both embedded and embodied. Being down here means having to face up to, rather than 
avoid; it means not standing back, but having an intimate engagement with, rather than 
distanced observation of Moving through a terrain at ground level is a very different 
experience from casting one's eye over a field of study from above. Such an approach 
raises questions about who is above and below, what gets to be in and what is out. Thus 
it reminds us that theory must always be informed by history and, as [ argue in Seeing 
her Sex, modem microhistory, with its vertical slice through time and its attention to 
detailed, focused, historical engagement is as necessary as the panoramic. horizontal, 
geographical travelling suggested by post-modernity [McGrath 2002: 6]. 
What I therefore propose in my work is a reconfiguration of both the subjects and objects 
of visual knowledge. This reconfiguration allows for the possibility of exploration and 
experimentation by a subject who is interested in a politics of location in a world of 
difference. I want to keep the notion of photographic discourse sufficiently open, arguing 
against the strong desire for closure in order to produce something that might be 'outside 
the realm of the known' [Rogoff 1996: 18]. The question, as Timothy Brennan puts it, is 
'how to stop theory simply becoming a code word for relatively predictable positions in 
the humanities and related social sciences, most of which turn on the ideas of social 
transformation, historical agency, the disposition of seltbood (however understood), and 
the heterogeneity of cultures - all posed in the context of critique of Enlightenment 
thought' [2003: 337]. 
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Mind and body, or nature and culture are best thought of as only having meaning in 
relation to each other. They can only be understood when we refute the pretension to 
examine those things that are furthest from ourselves and reject the separation of subjects 
and objects. Thus, many feminist writers have argued that the relationship between 
human subjects and their objects of knowledge is not clear cut, which is to say, not as 
separate or as distinct as we thought (or perhaps more accurately) have been taught. J 
This then is effective history as affective history; it is proximal and close, far-reaching 
and wide-angle. Once we stop distancing ourselves from our objects, things begin to look 
and (more importantly) to feel very different. The hierarchy between higher and lower 
senses is disturbed, as is the relationship between mind and body, self and other. Vision 
touches us, moves us; we feel and think simultaneously. 
The distinctive aspect of the work presented here is therefore two-fold: Firstly, I argue 
against boundaries, whether disciplinary, theoretical or bodily. Secondly, I want to 
emphasise the extent to which the visual objects of my discussion are not secondary. 
Increasingly I have argued that it is not a question of bringing the full weight of theory to 
bear upon the visual object, as ifit is merely a heuristic device that mighl.allow further 
theoretical extrapolation. Academic theory can be a blunt instrument that, when used 
heavy handedly, chips away at the objects that art history seeks to elevate to the status of 
a fetish. In the work presented here, it is the reverse: it is precisely the objects under 
discussion that allow me to disassemble theories. I want the meeting between subjects 
and objects to be on a more equal footing. This is a reciprocal process through which 
both subjects and objects are constructed. 'Things do not exist'. in Latour's words, 
'without being full of people' [2000: 12]. People, it follows, are also full of things - or in 
a psychoanalytic sense we intemalise objects. For example, Henri Bergson defines 
intuition as 'a kind of intellectual sympathy by which one places oneself within an object 
in order to coincide with what is unique in it and consequently inexpressible. Analysis, 
on the contrary, is the operation which reduces the object to the already known, that is, to 
elements common both to it and other objects' [Bergson cited in Weiss 1999: 168-169]. 
I See Evelyn Fox-Keller. Jane Gallop. Sandra Harding 
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My critical writing emanates from such an intellectual sympathy, from an encounter and 
engagement with the image. Here, it is not that theory is 'applied' to an existing object, 
but that the theory flows like a current between the object and the viewing subject. The 
vital spark is one of connection and contingency. Such experiences cannot be captured 
linguistically in their entirety (although this should not prevent us from finding a more 
adequate language for doing so) but are multi sensorial, made up of textures, colours, 
sounds and smells. In short, from the intricately woven from strands between subject and 
object, body and image that meet and make demands of each other. In our culture as 
Luce Irigaray has put it, the 'predominance of the look over smell, taste and touch and 
hearing has brought about an impoverishment of bodily relations' [Irigaray cited in Jay 
1993:493]. 
Photography, I therefore argue, might be better thought of as a medium in the sense of 
mediating between painting and film, between what has past, what happened then and 
there, exists in the present, here and now. Photographs are history and photography is a 
connective substance between subjects and objects. As I suggest in Seeing her Sex, 
photography, which offers us so much to see and is so vividly present. is in .reality 
predicated on what is past, absent. It is perhaps best understood as 'the return of the 
departed, as a powerful medium haunted by a pre-modem spectral world that lives on in 
a post-modem electronic universe' [McGrath 2002: 8-9]. My approach, ultimately, is 
one that allows thinking across different, sometimes incompatible, registers in order to 
create different worlds in which we are made aware of the contingencies. the randomness 
of our histories, personal and political. My approach opposes narrative. In the last 
instance, history is an interpretive social science, 'rather than a program to follow, a 
faction to join, or a theory to celebrate, it is an ad hoc, post hoc business. First you do it, 
then you name it' [see Geertz in Scott and Keates 2001: 1]. 
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2. PAST AND PRESENT 
The Emergeote of Visual Cultural Studies 
In this section I want to trace a trajectory within what broadly might be termed visual 
cultural studies. In using this term I want to suggest that visual cultural studies lies 
between the history of art and the dominant history of photography with its specific 
emphasis on aesthetic value, and an over-expansive cultural studies which aims (as does 
media studies) to dissolve such notions of value. Photography, which as a discourse is 
highly undisciplined, unwieldy and dispersed, has never fitted comfortably into either 
discipline. This has been both its strength and its weakness as a discipline caught 
between, and extending beyond, category boundaries. 
Other disciplines have more recently moved into the area of the visual and there are 
consequently a number of terms currently in circulation, particularly visual anthropology, 
visual culture, visual studies and visual methodologies. From the mid-1990s (and not 
before) books with the term 'visual culture' in their titles began to appear. These include 
Charles Jenks. Visual Culture (1995), Nicholas Mirzoefrs, An Introduction to Visual 
Culture (1998) and Jessica Evans and Stuart Hall's Visual Culture: The Reader (1999). 
Within these terms the visual comes first and so preserves the idea that there is a distinct 
area of 'the visual' , however it is understood, that can be prefixed to another term. 
Moreover, while anthropology seems to suggest, again, a rather too expansive, 
generalised understanding of culture, visual culture is much too discrete. Moreover, 
much of this work has been a re-iteration of already existing material, drawing on the 
triumvirate of marxism, structuralism and psychoanalysis. These debates have indeed 
made a significant contribution to comprehending the power of the photographic image. 
However, here I want to place emphasis upon Arjun Appadurai's use ofthe adjectival 
form, 'cultural', as opposed to the noun, 'culture'. Appadurai confesses a dislike of the 
noun culture, which for him, suggests some kind of 'object, thing, or substance' with all 
its notions of 'fixedness'. Appadurai suggests that 'cultural', on the other hand. builds on 
the context sensitive, contrast-centered heart of Saussurean linguistics' . He argues that 
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'Culture is not usefully regarded as a substance, but is better regarded as a dimension of 
phenomena, a dimension that attends to situated and embodied difference' [Appadurai 
1996: 12-13]. For Appadurai, cultural is a 'useful heuristic that can highlight points of 
similarity and contrast between all sorts of categories, classes, genders, roles, groups and 
nations' [ibid.]. He suggests that 'we regard as cultural only those differences that either 
express, or set the groundwork for, the mobilisation of group identities' [ibid.]. This is 
close to James Clifford's suggestion that we need to historicize the concept of culture in 
order to produce an understanding of the term 'that can preserve culture's differentiating 
functions while conceiving of collective identity as a hybrid, often discontinuous 
process. Culture is a deeply compromised idea I cannot yet do without' [Clifford 1988: 
10]. Yet clearly, 'there is no culture in and of itself [see Modood 1997: 4]. It is this sense 
of the indispensability of culture as well as its dynamic, mediating, and embodied 
understanding that I want to preserve here, 'the mol, not the chose' as Clifford Geertz 
puts it [2000: 11]. Geertz is clear: 'there is no chose' [ibid.]. 
I would argue that this is the terrain proper of visual cultural studies, and the arena within 
which photography is most usefully articulated. It must think 'visuality' (again a 
relational term which emphasises vision as process, not as accomplished fact) differently. 
Seeing is not simply physiological. It is a cultural, social, political, historical and 
unconscious process that is simultaneously embedded in specific discourses and 
embodied in human subjects; my argument within the work presented here is that it must 
be re-thought simultaneously both historically (in terms of its antecedents) and 
geographically (across disciplines). 
The gradual emergence of visual cultural studies as a different discipline or, perhaps 
more accurately, an indiscipline of differences can be traced through three historical 
moments: 
First, in the 1970s the dominant approach was structuralist semiotics, which offered the 
possibility of a science of signs through its close analysis of texts. Essentially, the 
emergence of structuralism marked 'the end of art theory' as a shift away from the 
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concerns of authorial agency and monography towards a close examination of texts [see 
Burgin 1986]. This was followed in the long 1980s (which extended well into the 1990s) 
by post-structuralism in which theory once again turned back towards the social and 
historical via the concept of discourse, as well as an intense, renewed interest in 
questions of subjectivity, sexuality and desire. Lastly, from the 1990s onwards there has 
been a move towards 'tender history' and 'sensual scholarship' [see Bruno: 2002 and 
Stoller: 1997]. This work recognises that vision is embodied and has sought to reinstate 
feeling alongside reason, arguing that vision is always in the realm of the other senses. 
The point here is that images inhabit the body; they move us, touch us, conjure up 
different times, places, smells and sounds as well as a flood of other images. They do not 
simply effect, but affect the subject. 
It is, of course, important to emphasise that these moments are not easily separated; they 
do not have clearly defined boundaries. The edges of any discourse are frayed. This 
notion of a kind of unravelling undoes any idea of distinct boundaries, of both historical 
chronology (before/after) and geographical location (inside/outside). And indeed there 
are many texts that both slip between these categories and have a relationship to more 
than one of them. Instead, my aim is to present a broad schema and to suggest that they 
might define three particular moments, representing what Rosalind Krauss has called the 
dominant theoretical 'tool of choice', with all its connotations of addiction [1996: 83]. 
As writers like Raymond Williams suggest, each contains both residual and emergent 
theories [see Williams 1983]. One theory does not simply supersede the previous one, 
but refashions it, incorporating certain facets, while repressing others. 
As I will argue, it is precisely at the edges of, and between such moments, that things 
start to happen. The development of these ideas is historically uneven, but broadly it 
effects a shift from a formalist textual analysis to more open and sensual embodiment; 
from closed structuralist methodology to a more open phenomenological approach. 
Stucturalism was, in effect, a response to culturalist approaches which simply saw 
cultural artefacts as the products or outcomes of experience. Gradually throughout the 
seventies more structuralist approaches contended that cultural forms were not simply 
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the products of, but what produced, experience. Thus human experience became 
problematised. It was no longer simply the ground of culture, but its effect, and 
consequently individuals were thus not some originary source of meaning, but its 
outcome [see Hall 1981]. Structuralist approaches argued that all language, including 
visual language, pre-existed the subject's entry into the world. Through such critiques 
authors came under question [Foucault 1977c] or were rendered redundant [Barthes 
1977] as emphasis shifted to a close examination of the formal, internal workings of the 
text. 
Culturalist and structuralist approaches shared in common a questioning of cultural value 
and it was this that became important to marginalised groups: feminist, working class, 
gay and lesbian as well as black groups. However, these approaches can be seen as two 
extremes within definitions of culture: an attempt to stop an over-expansive idea of 
culture as 'a whole way of Hfe' by narrowing it to a close and detailed analysis of 
specific 'texts' divorced from authors. Rather than meaning simply reflecting some 
already pre-given content that might be expressed by a fully fledged, well informed 
author, close attention was paid to the rules, codes, conventions that construct meaning. 
Emphasis was on the form, on how meaning was produced, rather than on the content, or 
on what was said (or envisaged). 
Post-structuralism, the 'tool of choice' of the second of the three historical moments, 
provides a pivotal, mediating discourse between structuralist semiotics and sensual, 
embodied approaches to scholarship. Drawing on structuralist strengths and tackling its 
weaknesses, post-structuralism argued that while language is arbitrary, meaning certainly 
is not. Instead it is the outcome of very specific historical, social and institutional 
discourse. The balance of power shifted from texts to bodies, and from idelology to 
discourse. 
Moreover, as Jane Flax contends, we never encounter a person without a body, or 
discursive practices without embodied practitioners [1993: 98]. Destined to return, the 
body of the subject (and telling history from the inside out) and the question of social 
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history (telling history from the bottom up) have been re-configured through the prism of 
geography (telling history cross-culturally). The cultural (for which read linguistic) turn 
in history and the historical turn in cultural studies was made through the passage of the 
subject's body who makes, quite literally, sense, meaning, within an historical, social and 
symbolic context that is not of her, or his own choosing. 
As I argued in the previous section, post-structuralism has been especially useful to 
feminist theory. The linguistic turn within the humanities was a volte-face from the 
rough contours of history and, simultaneously, from the unruly, excessive human body, 
making both body and history merely an effect, an outcome of language and of texts. 
Post-structuralist discourse, with its emphasis on a reader-as-subject, mediated between 
the closed world of textuaIity and the open field of history, making it possible to rethink 
social, historical and psychic embodiment in a different register. Greater attention was 
given to readers or viewers as desiring and fantasising subjects who make meaning, as 
much unconsciously as consciously. 
These three moments trace a trajectory that moves from language to flesh;.Jrom the high 
point of structural linguistics, a static, fonnal and closed system, to an understanding of 
visuality as socially and historically embodied and embedded. It marks a move away 
from 'language as the inaugural event of culture' towards' embodiment as the inaugural 
event of culture' [Levinas cited in Ziarek 20ot: 53]. Embodiment renders cartesian 
dualism obsolete. Within phenomenological approaches language and flesh are non-
hierarchically intertwined. As Haraway puts it, flesh is where 'materiality and semiosis 
join' [2000: 86]. We learn and think through and with our bodies as much as with our 
minds and consequently 'the obverse side of the linguistic construction of the body is the 
incarnation oflanguage' [see Ziarek 2001: 53]. Language, of course, is just as closely 
related to the pleasures of the flesh as it is to the world of ideas. It is a skin which brings 
us into contact with others [see Barthes cited in Haraway 2000: 85]. 
This trajectory from the 1970s onwards has presented not so much a radical reversal, but 
more a challenge to rethink the complex relationship between the historical materiality of 
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the body and the symbolic power of language. The demand was to 'think through the 
body' and to emphasise how 'thought and carnality are intertwined' [Gallop 1988 and 
Ziarek 2001: 49]. Bluntly, bodies are not texts, and cannot fully be understood as such. 
And, bodily experience, previously disdained and mistrusted has, albeit rather belatedly, 
re-entered the theoretical frame. As I argue in my book, those others who have carried 
the burden of corporeality (in terms of class, gender or race), who in short have been 
reduced to elementary needs or base sexuality, have of course a far greater interest and 
investment in the re-embodiment of ideas. 
Consequently, tracing the roots of somatic mistrust, and the de-embodiment of ideas, 
become important. In the late eighteenth century, science (which originally simply meant 
knowledge) is redefined and a distinction is drawn between experience and experiment. 
Knowledge gained through the body, experience, increasingly came to be viewed as a 
question of subjective interpretation (and also, increasingly, as feminine), while 
experiment, knowledge gained through the mind was understood as simple objective 
description (and specifically masculine) [see Williams 1976: 233]. Since the aim of 
science was to produce a discourse that reflected logical, rational and disembodied 
thought, mind was placed above body and bodies, one's own, and those of others, had to 
be mastered and controlled. 
The body in this sense became at best a shell. At worst, it was a cage. However, more 
recently the body has come to be perceived not as imprisoning, as something to escape 
from, but something to be embraced; '[it is] not a vehicle to be cast off, it is part of the 
homeland to which we are travelling' [Durham-Peters 1999b: 65]. In this sense, 
scholarship is of necessity a journey between the body and the world. It is a journey in 
two directions, geographical and historical; we enter into the space of the world and the 
world enters into the space of the body, producing a kind of sedimentary layering of 
memories and experiences. Bodies, fragile, breakable and evanescent, are 
simultaneously, stubborn, intractable and ineluctable. All discourse is embodied, and 
memory and history, experience and theory, have increasingly been re-thought not as 
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opposites, but in tandem. Brian Massumi calls this 'that thinking feeling', thus 
acknowledging embodiment as simultaneously psychic and somatic [2002: v]. 
The passage from textuality to embodiment is therefore not simply one from the static 
and rigid structuralist enterprise to embodied historical and social discourse. Rather it is a 
realisation of the need not to reject structuralism but to develop it further. Margrit 
Shildrick is right to point out, however, that in any case post-structuralism was 'not an 
issue about whether a material world really exists, but that knowledge of it can only ever 
be constructed through specific discursive practices' [1997: 95]. However, it is also 
recognition of the limitations of such an approach, for' linguisticality does not exhaust 
being' [see Grosz 1994: 147]. There is always a supplement and there are other ways of 
knowing. Moreover, discourse with its privileging of language, writing or speech, is 
simply inadequate for understanding the complexities of human subjectivity. I discuss 
this further in Section 3. The question of bodies and histories, precisely what was 
repressed within semiotic and structuralist theories of representation, re-entered the 
framework of knowledge through post-structuralism. 
The End of Art Theory 
Thinking about photography, then, necessarily means thinking through bodies. Here I 
take two bodies of work published in Britain at the beginning and end of the 80s as a 
means of tracing these debates in theory and practice: Victor Burgin's edited collection, 
Thinking Photography [1982] and Mitra Tabrizian's monograph, Correct Distance 
[1990]. It is important to remember, however, that these must be placed within the wider 
context of books published both here and in the United States in that decade2• The 
particular historical conjuncture which marked the pUblication of Thinking Photography. 
an ironic title to be sure, marked the emergence of a critical, theoretically informed 
photographic practice and history. The image on the cover, a Leica camera literally 
underpinned by theory, evoked what was then a radical approach to understanding 
~ Allan Sekula's Photography Against IN! Grain 119841 and Abigail Solomon-Godeau's Photography at the Dock 
119911, for instance, although slightly different endeavours. mirror Tabrizian's and Burgin's work. 
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photography. For the first time, Thinking Photography made available to both 
photographers and cultural historians new perspectives that radically challenged 
traditional art historical and technical conceptions of photography and its histories. It 
argued that it was both possible and necessary, to "think' photography, i.e. theorise its 
histories and analyse its images. The anthology, while acknowledging the importance of 
feminist contribution in its introduction, somewhat disingenuously excluded such work 
on the grounds that none of it quite fitted, or that it was not specifically photographic. 
This demonstrates the limitations of the debate at that particular historical moment where 
the objects of photographic discourse could be challenged, but the overall structure of the 
discipline could not. Burgin stated: "It remains for me to explain an absence. There are 
no essays by women in this anthology. This is neither oversight nor prejudice. It is the 
contingent effect of a conjuncture' [1982: 14]. The particular historical conjuncture that 
marked the publication of Thinking Photography was the post-68 emergence of a 
photographic practice, criticism and history that was theoretically informed by Marxism, 
structuralism and psychoanalysis. The book, broadly, took issue with the Left's 
commitment to documentary as the visual representation of politics, suggesting instead 
that a politics of representation itself must be developed. While lip-service was paid to 
the issues of gender and race, it ignored the specifically feminist contribution to these 
debates, with its emphasis on the question of the sexual politics of representation, as well 
as questions of the racial politics of representation. There were no contributions by black 
authors. 
While Thinking Photography brought together a collection of essays by men, all of 
whom were white, published between 1970 and 1980, Correct Distance, by the Iranian 
feminist Mitra Tabrizian, published in 1990, comprised both photographic work and 
essays made between 1980 and 1990. A book of photographs and a book about 
photography; a book about the sexual and racial politics of representation, Tabrizian's 
work represented a significant development of the politics of representation from a 
feminist and post-colonial perspective. Correct Distance provides one map of the ways 
in which the debates on sexual difference and photographic practice took shape in the 
pivotal period of the 80s, with its emphasis on the sexual and racial politics of 
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representation and the questions of visual pleasure and human desire. In her introduction 
to the book, Griselda Pollock traced the significant shifts that had taken place during 
the 1980s. As she put it, the 'radical cultural practice of the seventies seemed to 
experience the weight of ideological power in culture and hence felt the need to practice 
a negative deconstructive aesthetic as a strategy of resistance' [Pollock in Tabrizian: np]. 
By the 1980s what emerged was work that had been theoretically informed by 
psychoanalysis. It was 'less disciplined by a practice of disidentification and negation 
and more willing to address the power of fantasy and destabilising force of pleasure' 
[ibid.]. 
Such questions, introduced by feminists, became increasingly important. In both theory 
and practice, these issues were primarily addressed through theories of sexual and racial 
difference, not as something to be simply wished away or, perhaps more accurately, 
repressed, but something to be understood and utilised in order to fuel new struggles for 
justice. This is a question of ethics. Moreover, the practice of constant vigilance, the 
hallmark of the 70s, had by the end of the 80s (as Laura Marks has suggested) become 
'exhausting' and more importantly 'not much fun' [2002: 202]. 
My own work in this period focused on the politics of representation within the fields of 
gender and sexuality. From 'Re-reading Edward Weston' [1986] and 'Looking hard: the 
male body' [1987] to my essays on the visual representation of HIV and AIDS, 
'Dangerous Liaisons' [1990] and 'Deviance and Difference' [1993], I sought to examine 
discourses of gender and sexuality, and regimes of representation from modernist art 
photography to popular culture. In all these essays I aimed to show how these visual 
practices were part of a wider and historically longer social and sexual economy. I 
therefore employed structuralist and post-structuralist theories which allowed a close 
analysis of the image and the observer, while simultaneously paying attention to the 
social and historical contexts in which both are produced. My argument is that images 
are places of hard graft. Photography constructs a seamless rhetoric of reality that 
renders invisible labour, material and symbolic on the part of both producer and 
consumer. In this sense, images are not simply illustrations, but the sites where social, 
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sexual and other differences are constructed and, as I argue in 'Deviance and 
Difference', can therefore be contested [McGrath 1993]. 
As I suggested in Section I, one of the most significant contributions of feminism has 
been the refusal to accept traditional disciplinary boundaries. Its task rather has been to 
trace the discourses of femininity as a means of understanding how the term 'woman' 
has no intrinsic meaning but is socially, culturally and psychically produced and thus has 
meaning only in relation to 'man', as black does in relation to white. Such distinctions, of 
course, come at a price. In her work Tabrizian places particular emphasis on the 
intersection of race and gender and upon the ways in which the other is ultimately 
unknowable. As in much feminist work of the period, psychoanalysis occupies a place of 
particular importance because of its resistance to the idea that femininity is either innate, 
natural and biologically determined or simply culturally and socially constructed. The 
unconscious, a space of 'difference', represented an opening between the biological and 
the social that is reducible to neither. Moreover, psychoanalysis explained the durability 
of ideologies as not simply a matter of false consciousness that might be overcome by 
consciousness-raising, but as profoundly unconscious. Tabrizian's work-therefore drew 
upon the conventions of photography and film, on popular and mass culture, and on 
structuralist and post-structuralist theories in order to demonstrate how ideologies of 
gender and race have real effect. 
Five pieces of photographic work were presented in Tabrizian's book. The first two, 
College o/Fashion [1981-2] and Governmentality [1982-3], presented black and white 
documentary photography. The images were accompanied by text drawn from different 
discourses, which made the viewer/reader aware that it is in the space between these two 
symbolic systems that she or he produces meaning. For Tabrizian, 'representations are 
neither reducible to a referent outside ... nor to an origin in a subject' [Tabrizian 
Governmenlality, 1982: np]. The centrepiece, Correct Distance [1984-5], draws on the 
conventions of the underworld of film noir and the enigmatic femme fatale who must 
either be killed or submitted to the law, or as Tabrizian points out, occasionally she 
submits to patriarchal law and is reformed, to become a 'good woman'. The final two 
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works, The Blues, [1986-1987], on the complexities of the nexus of race, gender and 
class, and Surveillance [1988-89], a commentary on the (then) recent history of 
Tabrizian's native Iran, both raise questions of other differences and perspectives which 
challenge the dominance of the West's perspective. 
These two books by Burgin and Tabrizian provide useful markers in the emergence and 
development of the project of visual cultural studies in theory and practice, and the 
importance of photographic discourse within it. For those working in the field of visual 
cultural studies the question of agency and of the relationship between theories, histories 
and politics became increasingly urgent in the political climate of the 1980s and 1990s. 
Post-structuralism, with its double emphasis on historical discourse and human desire, 
provided a means of resisting the rigid division of 'theoretical sophistication versus 
historical description, attention to historical text versus social context, imaginative, 
subjective interpretation versus objective, true description' [see Spiegel cited in McGrath 
2002: 8-9]. 
History and Discoune 
Discourse offered a more fluid understanding of the relationship between such 
dichotomies. 'Discurrere', as Martin Jay reminds us, literally means 'a running around in 
all directions' [1993: 16]. It can be internally contradictory and it is dispersed; it is both 
systematic and unsystematic and resists the fantasy of a narrative logic. The study of 
discourse aims to link previously unconnected cultural sites. Discourse cuts across 
comfortable boundaries and is not totally coherent. However, as Kluge puts it (speaking 
of film) understanding completely is a kind of cognitive. conceptual imperialism that 
colonises its objects. 'If I have understood everything then something has been emptied 
out' [1981-82: 211]. 
Meaning and knowledge are, of necessity, incomplete, not scientific. Discourse allows 
for direction without a predetennined destination; it enables us to blur boundaries 
without burning our bridges [see Braidotti1994: 1-39]. The question is one of how to 
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keep the notion of discourse sufficiently open, attentive to contingency and inconsistency 
and to argue against the desire for closure. This demands that we look both beyond and 
beneath the threshold of the already visible. It means abandoning safety nets and taking 
the risk of producing something that we do not already know. 
In this sense I wanted to utilise both structural and post-structural approaches within a 
reconfigured historical and geographical context. In Seeing her Sex, my intention was to 
examine how a cluster of scopic regimes bring language across in order to produce a new 
visual rhetoric. I attempt to negotiate a space between the social and the cultural, the real 
and representation in order to understand discursivity not as the opposite of reality, but 
simply as reality as we know it [Shildrick 1997: 95]. As Joan Scott argues, when the 
'reality effect' is either dispensed with entirely, or offered as incontestable truth, we have 
reached the end of history [2001: 88]. The problem, Antoinette Burton suggests, will not 
be solved by 'recourse to the redeeming power of the social'. For her, the important 
question is 'when and how the social in social history gets ascribed to the "archive", by 
which historians tend to mean "hard data", whether in the form of national repositories' 
institutional records or some kinds of "documentary" evidence, while the cultural is 
identified in very general terms with the linguistic turn, which is taken to mean the realm 
oflanguage and/or the symbolic' [2001: 65]. However, as she points out, the archive 
does not contain raw data, only objects that are always, already textual in nature. The 
binarism of either/ or must be resisted and replaced with a more dynamic both/and. The 
point is to re-think the relationship between the tenns. Burton continues, '[T]hat the 
archive and the linguistic turn are presumed to be antithetical points to the considerable 
limitations of the debate, as well as a certain fashionable willingness to use 
postmodernism as a Whipping-post for all that is allegedly "wrong" with contemporary 
scholarship' [2001: 65~]. 
The concept of post-modernity is to be thanked for lessening our often misplaced over-
confidence in the truth, the fact, the real; for casting radical doubt on a conceited belief 
that we can grasp things as they really are, when the plain truth is, however, that we 
cannot. History, in the last instance, is not knowable in its totality. It is the inaccessible 
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Real, an absent cause [see Ziarek 2001: 96]. And while the archive must not be 
dispensed with, it is not the source of absolute, final truth either. What it contains are the 
textual traces of material lives which are then fashioned, by people. into narratives that 
are necessarily incomplete, fractured. It is in the spaces between objects and words, and 
through contextualisation, that historical meaning is created. In this sense I take 
documentary study to be the place where 'imagination encounters and tries to come to 
terms with reality' [Coles 1992: 267]. And in most languages. as Le Goff notes. the term 
history 'denotes both historical science and an imaginary story' [1992: 120]. 
The articles and essays, as well as my book, examine and develop arguments that are 
always located in, but also move beyond, the archive. These essays are attempts to try 
and imaginatively re-think questions of representation and discursive formations, in 
order to foreground how identities are forged culturally and historically. As feminist and 
social historians know only too well, history is not simply waiting to be discovered but 
must be made, brought into being, created. Moreover, as I demonstrate, identities are 
both made and destroyed through history. Yet the unknowability of history, or indeed of 
identity, of where we have come from and who we are, is not simply problematic, but a 
passionate resource for a journey towards a future that might be different from the 
present. 
History and Identity 
In an important essay, 'Cultural Identity and Cinematic Representation' [1982], Stuart 
Hall offers some directions for embarking on that journey. Although speaking 
specifically of Caribbean identity, he makes clear a generally applicable point about the 
crucial relationship between history, identity and representation. In the opening pages he 
states that there are at least two different ways of thinking about cultural identity (note 
the adjectival fonn). The first, he says: 
'defines cultural identity in terms of one, shared culture, a sort of 
collective "one true self', hiding inside the many other, more 
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superficial or artificially imposed "selves" which people with a shared 
culture and ancestry hold in common. Within the terms of this 
definition, our cultural identities reflect the common historical 
experiences and shared cultural codes which provide us, as "one 
people," with stable, unchanging and continuous frames of reference 
and meaning, beneath the shifting divisions and vicissitudes of our 
actual history' [Hall 1989: 69]. 
The second, he describes as 'a related but different view of cultural identity which 
qualifies, even if it does not replace, the first' [Hall 1989: 35]. This distinction is crucial. 
Hall, rightly, will not dismiss the importance of the first for those groups who have been 
dispossessed of their history. However, for Hall, imagination is equally as important as 
experience, and here he means more specifically imagination that is fuelled by, but not 
only confined to, experience: 
'[Cultural identity] belongs to the future as much as the past. It is 
not something which already exists, transcending place, time, 
history and culture .... Far from being eternally fixed in some 
essentialised past, cultural identities come from somewhere, have 
histories, but like everything which is historical, they undergo 
constant trans-fonnation. Far from being fixed in some 
essentialised past, they are subject to the "play" of history , culture 
and power. Far from being grounded in a mere "recovery" of the 
past, which is waiting to be found, and which, when found, will 
secure our sense of ourselves into eternity, identities are the 
names we give to the different ways we are positioned by, and 
position ourselves within, the narratives of the past.' [Hall 1989: 
70]. 
History is that process of narration, and our agency matters. Identities are not outwith 
history, but embodied in a particular time and place. Hall's point is that identity is not 
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natural and unchanging, but cultural and contingent. It does not pre-exist its invocation in 
the present. Thus the fonnation of any identity is a political process. We are positioned 
by discourse but, equally, we can, and indeed must, position ourselves; we must both 
claim our histories and simultaneously make our identities. 
Feminism and post-colonialism, as both political practices and theoretical activities, have 
re-thought the relationship between language and the body, discourse and experience, 
theory and politics. Both have refused to separate out a politics of practical engagement 
from a more theoretically driven, academic debate. Neither can afford to ignore academic 
theory, or reject political practice. And while experience is not, in Annette Kuhn's 
words, 'the trump card of authenticity', it cannot, and indeed should not, be perceived as 
something to be suspicious of, or that needs to be overcome [2002: 33]. Only those 
groups who have a relatively secure knowledge of their past, who have not been 
dispossessed of their history and who see their experiences being re-iterated and re-
presented, can afford to ignore experience. As Luce Irigaray puts it, 'to deconstruct 
certainly, but that already represents a luxury for whoever has not built a world' [Irigaray 
2002: 4]. For those who have to construct their own history from the ashes of the past, 
experience cannot, and must not, be ignored. It is vital to survival. The task, Hall 
suggests is not over-priVilege one or other side of the equation, but to recognise the limits 
of each and leave room for the interplay of both. Theoretical deconstruction should, and 
must, be brought together with the material reality of experience. Paul Connerton states, 
'our experiences of the present largely depends upon our knowledge of the past. .. our 
images of the past commonly serve to legitimate a present social order' [1989: 3]. Yet, as 
I have tried to demonstrate, it need not be so. 
The past, as Hall knows, is not recuperable; it is not common, unchanging, stable, and, 
moreover, neither are we. All meanings are of necessity post-meanings, meanings after 
the event and historical events are themselves, arrested moments, caesura [see Cadava 
1997: xx-xxii]. There are simply no originary moments, no essences. no identities 
without difference, whether of history or of ourselves [see McGrath 2002: 9]. This is a 
question of a human need to be actively located in history. to have knowledge of our 
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past, rather than be incorporated into dominant narratives. Like Hall, I argue that identity 
must be an open-ended, politicised process in which we accept that while we have been, 
and are, positioned within historical discourse, we need not live through the identities 
that are ascribed to us by other, more powerful, groups. Hall argues that of necessity this 
is an ongoing process of trans-formation and rather than having a position we must 
actively position ourselves. Identities, or subject positions, are not transcendental and 
universal, but immanent and contingent and as Allen and Young suggest, 'a politics that 
seeks to enact social change needs a concept of agency' [1989: 10]. It cannot do without 
one. Moreover, the human subject is 'not an abstract knower, but a living actor that 
makes itself what it is within a particular historical context [ibid.: 3]. As I demonstrate in 
my work, and as Hall argues, feminism and post-colonialism are politics of invention, 
not of nostalgia. 
At a more fundamental level, an anti-essentialist (but not anti-humanist) approach to the 
question of identity means accepting that while we have not created ourselves, we are not 
deprived of creativity [see Benjamin 1995: 5]. It does mean accepting that "from the 
moment we are born', the hard truth is 'that we have lost our origins' [Braidotti 1994: 
14]. It is this that creates what Rosi Bradidotti calls a 'generative void' [1991: 99]. This 
is not a deficiency, some absence or loss. 'It does not constitute a lacuna that must be 
filled. It is nothing more, nothing less, than the unfolding of a space in which it is once 
more possible to think' [Foucault cited in Braidotti 1991: 1]. For Braidotti, this is a 
creative space opened up by the desire to know, which is always a desire for what is not 
yet known. Thus knowledge is always marked as much by a dark and shadowy 
unconscious as by the blinding light of reason. As Hall says, reflecting on his own 
narrative of displacement, 'it is worth remembering that all discourse is 'placed' (or we 
might say situated) and the heart has its reasons' [HaI11989: 69]. Hall deliberately 
suggests that feeling (the heart as the seat of emotion and feeling) and thought (the mind 
as the seat of rational thought) are not separate, but embodied. The heart does have its 
reasons and the realm of affect, emotion, feeling, human experience must not, cannot, 
and should not be subordinate. Hall refuses to separate culture from other forms of 
identity; refuses the ultimately reactionary call to redefine political problems of social 
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divisions as merely 'cultural' while acknowledging that images are not immaterial but a 
question of human rights [see also Strathern: 1999: 129]. 
Hall argues from both the heart and mind. He comes close to providing what Flax calls 
'an adequate account of subjectivity' as one which would have to do justice to a being 
who is simultaneously 'embodied, fantasising, rational, language-using, related to others, 
endowed with a distinctive temperament and inner-world, socially constituted and 
desiring' [1993: 118]. This is both a passionate and political, emotional and intellectual 
account of human subjectivity and of historical identity. Thus, Hall steers a critical path 
that resists an essentialist identity and the worse, ultimately disabling, extremes of anti-
humanism. The uncertainties and vagaries of histories and identities are not simply 
problematic, but creative resources for what, borrowing from Williams, we might call a 
journey of cultural and political hope [see Williams 1983]. 
Our minds, our identities and our histories are not already made up, but are, always 
'strategic political invocations' which are neither rooted in bodies nor in tradition. The 
'categories of identity we take for granted as rooted in physical bodies (gender and race) 
or our cultural heritages (ethnic or religious) are, in fact, retrospectively linked to these 
roots; they don't follow naturally or predictably from them' [Scott 2001: 285]. 
Commenting on the work of Aime Cesaire, James Clifford puts it like this: 'the roots of 
tradition are cut and retied, collective symbols appropriated from external influence. For 
Cesaire, culture and identity are inventive and mobile. They need not take root in 
ancestral plots; they live by pollination, by (historical) transplanting' [1988: 15]. All 
cultures, and we might add, all identities, are the results of borrowings, mixtures. 
Differences, ultimately, have to be made; they are performative. Strategic political 
invocations are simply those moments 'in which discourse becomes productive .... [and] 
performativity is that aspect of discourse that has the capacity to produce what it 
names ... perfonnativity is the discursive mode through which ontological effects are 
installed' [Butler 1996: 112]. It is the installing of those 'ontological effects' that I now 
want to discuss. Questions of identities and bodies have been at the heart of my work as I 
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have tried to understand how images and institutions, practices and histories position 
observers, whether in front of or behind the camera, as men or women, hetero- or 
homosexual, black or white. But, as I have shown, it is this that also allows us to position 
ourselves differently, and to suggest that there are other histories to be written, and 
theories to be developed, that are more adequate to the needs of the present. 
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3. PAST, PRESENT, FUTURE 
In the Realm of the Senses: Towards a History of Human Geography 
It is through the concept of embodiment that a growing literature on 'sensual 
scholarship' has emerged over the last ten years [see Stoller 1997]. Such work, 
originating in cinematic and photographic practice or from other disciplines, notably 
anthropology, has encouraged scholars to argue against 'the denigration of vision' and to 
challenge the idea that sight is necessarily, or only, objectifying, distancing and 
disengaged [see Jay: 1993]. While it is certainly true that sight is privileged in Western 
culture, it is not separate from the other senses. Embodied engagement is simultaneously 
psychic and somatic. Sensuous theories argue that films and photographs quite literally 
mediate between ourselves and our world, keeping us in touch with and bringing us into 
sensuous contact, rather than simply keeping us away, at a distance. 
This more philosophical work has placed the human body at its decentred heart. The two 
disciplines from which this work emerged, feminism and post-structuralism, raised vital 
questions about the relationship between vision, knowledge and bodies. Following this, 
or rather implicitly raised within it, was the question of the scholar's own body which 
has, albeit slowly, re-entered the framework of knowledge. 
Scholars undertake an intellectual itinerary, a passage that is cut through the world, made 
by way of images, objects, bodies. Sensual approaches argue for the need to bring 
theoretical analysis together with subjective experiences, arguing that to look is always 
in the realm of the other senses: smell, taste, sound and touch. These senses aim to bring 
into play private memory and public history. This more phenomenological, 
intersubjective approach to visual cultural studies acknowledges the sensory, emotional 
and imaginative dimensions of looking as a sensuous archaeology of knowledge written 
on. with and through the body. 
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The limits of Language 
Language, it is argued, is not an adequate model for understanding human experience. 
Images can counter 'the anaesthetising influence oflanguage' [Stoller 1997: 53]. They 
often either bypass or move us beyond words to tears or laughter. Words can make us 
stop and think, but they can also cut us off from our other senses. The challenge is to find 
both new languages and images that are more inventive. Such approaches acknowledge 
the space of the image as a place of political imagination and sensual communication. In 
this sense bodies and images become interwoven. Visual anthropologists like David 
MacDougall make a powerful argument for how the visual 'opens more directly onto the 
sensorium than written texts' [1998: 262 ]. We enter into the space and the image enters 
into our body, not simply our head. Here hand and heart (rather than vision and voice) 
suggest that there are other ways of knowing and being in the world. Michael Polanyi 
calls this 'tacit knowing'. For Polanyi, the things we know are perhaps 'more than we 
can tell' [Polanyi cited in MacDougall 1998: 264]. 'The unsaid is the common ground of 
social relations, communication and ethnography. It is also the domain of the image' 
[Polanyi cited in MacDougall 1998: 274]. Durkheim, speak.ing of the nature ofa concept, 
puts it like this: 'which of us knows all the words of the language he speaks and the 
entire significance of each?' [Durkheim 1976: 434-5]. We need both a knowledge of, and 
a feeling for, language. 
And, this is how Nan Goldin describes the process ofmak.ing a photograph: 'It's as ifmy 
hand were a camera. If it were possible I'd want no mechanism between me and the 
moment of photographing. The camera is as much part of my everyday life as talking or 
eating or sex. The instant of photographing instead of creating distance, is a moment of 
clarity and emotional connection for me' [1986: 6]. 
For Goldin, photography is a form of communication. A photograph is a caress, a form 
of tenderness, a way of making contact with and touching someone. Photographs are 
fleshy and photography is a practice that extends beyond the photograph's frame 
[Gundlach 1998: 6]. In her work the view she presents us with 'is not that of a detached 
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observer' but rather 'an intimate view from close up' [ibid.]. In her recently published 
book, The Skin of the Film, Laura Marks distinguishes (while acknowledging their 
relation) between optic and haptic visuality. 3 She argues that while opsis is detached, and 
maintains a distance from its object, hapsis presses close to, has contact with. In the 
latter, the surface of the film, video, or for that matter the photograph, is more like skin, 
(and less like a screen) that brings 'its audience into contact with the material forms of 
memory' [2000: 162-164]. Goldin and Marks understand vision as embodied, sensory. 
For Goldin 'real meaning is an invocation of the color, smell, sound and physical 
presence, the density and flavor of Hfe' [ibid.]. 
I conclude with this example of visual practice in order to attempt to develop a more 
dynamic understanding of what it means to know. There is of course 'nothing known 
except by a knowing subject' [Adorno in Arato and Gebhardt 1978: 504]. By the 1990s 
questions of both ethics and sensual scholarship emerge within feminist discourse.4 
Knowledge, it is argued, is embodied; it is contingent and contextual. We have contact 
with, rather than distance from, the image. Images touch us, invoke feelings as much as 
thoughts. We cannot always put these sensory feelings into words, but as I have argued, 
this does not absolve us of the responsibility to find a more adequate language for 
expressing the sensible and to fail to do so is to contribute to the continued absence of 
the senses from discussions on vision and visuality. Photography, like cinema, is a 
discourse that 'exists on the threshold oflanguage and language must bring it across in 
order to have a conversation with it' [Marks 2000: xvi]. Marks implies that this must be a 
dialogic process in which one or other side is not privileged. 
Such work has grown out of an antipathy to the disembodied approach of the humanities 
within which the human body had become alienated, suspect, denigrated. In its drive for 
fixed standards, the human sciences subordinated body to mind, emotion to reason. This 
forecloses crucial sensory aspects of knowledge, creating a kind of 'symbolic 
evisceration' • an incapacity to acknowledge the wide diversity of our different modes of 
3 Marks borrows the term from the art historian Alois Riegl who worked with textiles. 
4 See Jane Gallop, Elizabeth Grosz, Jane Flax. and Eva Ziarek. 
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knowing as processes [Feldman cited in Stoller 1997: 82]. Recent debates have 
foregrounded the question of how we come to know rather than simply what it is we 
know. Knowledge and vision are thus embodied, affective, visceral, 'motivated by 
fantasy, by denial and by desire' as much as by reality, truth and reason [Rogoff 2000: 
27]. Representations here are conceptualised less as objects and more as full of social 
and cultural relations, simultaneously producing our subjectivity as we endow them with 
meaning. This is a dynamic concept of how images literally mediate, allow us to 
communicate, to impart and share meanings with each other. It is a reciprocal process, 
reminding us, as John Durham-Peters does, that 'our interaction will never be a meeting 
of cogitos but at its best may be dance in which we sometimes touch' [1999: 268]. 
Durham-Peters' choice of dance as the analogy for communication is deliberate. It is a 
reminder both of the inadequacies of language for describing certain embodied practices 
and, of course that it takes (at least) two to tango. Communication is, even then, a hit and 
miss affair and standing on other people's toes might also be a necessary part of the 
process. 
Sensual approaches to scholarship have sought to create new modes of connection 
between reason and emotion, seeing and touching, thinking and feeling. Here, senses are 
connected, non-hierarchically inter-linked. They are not distinct activities. We think 
through and with our bodies and we are touched and moved by images. Thus such 
approaches seek to explore the power of affect. This is not simply a matter of replacing 
one set of supposedly outmoded concepts with another, but to argue for an expanded 
understanding that acknowledges the relationship between corporeal, visceral emotion, 
and cognitive analytic reason. It marks a reinstatement of the body arguing against a 
language that is bloodless, dull, drained of all life and passion. Instead, what is argued 
for is more 'inspired language' [LevinasI998: 109]. Inspired vision, too, has an 
important role to play. To have meaning, knowledge must be brought to life and life can, 
and must, as Goldin shows us, be brought to knowledge. 
As I suggested in the opening section, feminism has, of necessity, argued for thinking 
across differing registers of life, labour and language. Here epistemology is, first and 
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last, ontological. We need to develop the ability to work alongside and between images 
and words, rather than simply work on images (hence the reason for placing Goldin's 
tactile approach in this section, in order to find a means of bringing thought into contact 
with an image). This may well mean 'caressing rather than grasping' [see Davis 1993: 
270]. Knowledge here is conceptualised not as possession, but as empathy. Caressing is 
not about appropriation; it is not about capturing something. In the caress, as Levinas 
argues, it is not clear who touches and who is touched, and perhaps this is closer to the 
processes of viewing and touching as reciprocal process dispersed throughout the skin 
[Levinas 1987: 116-118]. 
The Problem of Experience 
Through such embodied approaches, history and reason, memory and feeling, have come 
into a different alignment. However, memories and feelings, as opposed to explanation 
and analysis, seem at first sight to inhabit an altogether different register. As Annette 
Kuhn puts it, 'emotion and memory bring into playa category in which film theory - and 
cultural theory more generally - is ill-equipped to deal: experience' [2002: 33]. Vivian 
Sobchack points out that experience is most commonly perceived as a 'mushy, soft term 
- a remainder (and reminder) of the sloppy liberal humanism that retrospectively 
characterised cinema studies before it was transformed by the scientific methods of the 
technically precise vocabularies of structuralism and semiotics' [1992: xiv]. 
The response to liberal humanism has largely been that of an ultimately disabling anti-
humanism. This has proved inadequate. Scott Warren, for example has been critical of 
'the ignorance and destruction of subjectivity that has generally characterized Marxism 
in our century' [Warren cited in Sobchack 1992: xvii]. While the deconstruction of 
sovereign subjectivity was certainly necessary, the outcome as Ken Plummer suggests, 
has been that the subject has been 'eliminated altogether, the human being becoming an 
epistemological disaster' [2001: 51. The point is that neither liberal- or anti-humanism is 
satisfactory. Rather, the task is to think between the two terms; to re-think the 
relationship between experience and knowledge and what it means to be human. More 
than seventy years ago, Walter Benjamin's incitement was to 'undo the alienation of the 
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corporeal sensorium, to restore the instinctual power of the human body's senses for the 
sake of humanity's self preservation and to do this, not by avoiding the [then] new 
technologies, but by passing through them' [Buck-Morss 1992: 5]. The senses, 
according to Sobchack are 'different openings onto the world that co-operate as a unified 
system of access. The lived body does not have senses - it is, rather, sensible' [1992: 77]. 
The desire for fixed standards in science (and human and social sciences are not exempt 
from this) is strong precisely because of 'the frightening indeterminacy of experience 
which constantly challenges the idea that there are such standards' [Hastrup cited in 
Stoller 1997: 91]. To experience is often to be powerfully overwhelmed in a way that is 
not reducible to reason alone. It is a difficult reminder of our own histories, of the fact 
that we have learned through our body, as well as that there are 'no facts without value, 
no reason with out emotion, and no knowledge without experience' [Schweder cited in 
Stoller 1997: 91]. Psychoanalysis, as a bridge between internal and external worlds, is 
important here. 
This need not be frightening, but enabling, exciting and enlivening. It offers an 
opportunity to develop an expressive vocabulary that allows us to do this. Looking is 
experiential. Photographs as tokens of exchange, literally pass through hands; they are 
not just looked at, but touched, pressed close to the body, even kissed and in this sense 
they are more akin to secular icons, curious marvels, than realist documents. The 
paradoxical status of the photograph is that it is both icon and index. Photographs are 
images that are perhaps best understood as 'a certain existence which is more than that 
which the idealists call a representation, but less than that which the realist calls a thing, 
an existence placed half-way between the "thing" and the "representation'" [Bergson 
1988: 9]. This is not unlike Derrida's concept of communication as 'envois' or sendings 
that never reach their final destination nor return to their point of origin [Derrida cited in 
Jay 1993: 508]. In this sense photography is a medium of visual communication through 
which we learn about others' vision and share our own. Photographs are simultaneously 
spaces we inhabit and objects that inhabit us. They are places in which we can begin to 
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think differently about the material and conceptual, symbolic and sensual worlds we 
inhabit. 
Epilogue 
Photography, as I have argued, does have an ignoble history as a technology of 
ethnographic domination and control whether imperial, colonial, racial or sexual. It is, 
however, equally a form of counter-memory, a means of creating 'a sensory and 
collective horizon for people trying to live a life in the interstices of modernity' 
[Kracauer 1997: xxxiv]. 
Siegfried Kracauer argued against the view of photography and cinema as simply or only 
instrumental. While 'photographability' had, even by the 1920s, 'become the condition 
under which reality is constituted and perceived', both cinema and photography still 
offered their 'share of exhilarating and liberatory impulses' [ibid.: xvii; xxvi]. because of 
their ability to picture 'transient material life, life at its most ephemeral' [ibid.: xlix; 19]. 
For writers like Kracauer, photography, and cinema, equally provide the possibility of 
'an alternative public sphere' [ibid.: xxxiv]. I want to preserve this idea because it is still 
relevant to the present. The global culture we now live in is predominantly a visual and 
aural culture. Our eyes and ears have been, and are, shaped by powerful corporations and 
there is growing evidence that 'the psychic world', as Richard Kearney puts it 'is as 
colonized as the physical world by the image industry' [1988: 1]. Yet, as Kracauer 
suggests, it is much too simplistic to suggest that this is all that happens. 
Our task, now, will be 'to find the forms of language, visual, verbal, that will allow for 
the connections between cultures - of affiliation, recognition, antagonism - without 
dissipating the voices in which they clash' [Rose 1996: 149]. Jacqueline Rose suggests 
that the solution will not be pluralism. 'The rhetoric of pluralism can also be a way of 
concealing the depths of our conflicts. It can also be a way of promoting them' [ibid.]. 
For writers like Rose, there can be no way of understanding political (and here I include 
CUltural) identities 'without letting fantasy into the frame ... fantasy, far from being the 
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antagonist of public, social being plays a central, constitutive role in the modem world of 
states and nations' [ibid.: 4]. 
In a contemporary analysis of culture and communication, John Durham-Peters suggests 
that we 'should eschew the project of assigning everyone a homeland in the world of 
representations ... and instead join the project of attacking the inequitable allocation of the 
opportunity to dream and follow dreams ... [we should] move from a hermeneutics of 
suspicion to a pragmatics ofjustice ... the only antidote to insulting fantasies is the right 
of reply'. Arguing against censorship and a cultural asceticism. he suggests that we need 
'a public sphere, not a smashing of images ... a conflict of representations, not a purity of 
depictions' [1999b: 37-38]. 
Such a vision, or voice, will not be univocal; it will necessarily be imperfect. It will be as 
much about the power of the unconscious fantasy as conscious reason. It will have to be, 
an act of imagination rather than a simple return to realism (although, realism has not yet 
had its day). Cultural experimentation however, need not be at odds with politics or 
ethics. Shohat and Starn usefully remind us that images are representations not only in 
the mimetic sense, but also in the political sense' [1994: 180, my emphasis]. The 
photograph's frame thus 'marks a provisional limit; its content points beyond that frame, 
referring to a multitude of real life phenomena which cannot possibly be encompassed in 
their entirety' [Kracauer 1969: 58, my emphasis]. 
The question then might be how to expand the limits of the frames we have and really 
perceive them as merely provisional in order to produce a different picture. 
Deconstruction, as Derrida suggested, 'must neither reframe nor dream of the pure and 
simple absence of the frame [Derrida cited in Carroll 1987: 131]. Deconstructive analysis 
can, and indeed must now be brought together with material realities. Modernity, 
whether late, post or liquid is still wrestling to find answers to the question with which it 
arrived: 'how to deal with the people' [Chow 1995: 14]. In essence the crisis of late 
modernity provides an opportunity to re-think and re-evaluate what modernity not only 
what modernity is, but what it might be. And this necessarily entails a re-thinking of 
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questions of political representation and cultural identity. As I have argued images are a 
question of human rights and visual cultural studies has a key role to play here. 
For writers such as Durham-Peters the problem of communication (and this must include 
visual communication) is therefore now less a question of semantics, more a question of 
politics and ethics: the demands of morality and justice. He suggests 'we should be less 
worried about how signs arouse divergent meanings than the conditions that keep us 
attending to our neighbours and other beings different from us' [l999a: 268- 9]. Recent 
cultural theory urges us to think beyond either 'transcendental sameness' or 'the most 
dehumanising exile and estrangement, an otherness in which the humanity of the other 
cannot be recognised' [see Levin 1993: 18]. Narratives of either total homogenization, or 
of absolute otherness are unsatisfactory. Moreover such narratives have their roots in the 
modem body with the increasing separation between inner and outer self and between 
self and other. The work that I have presented here is rooted in such political and ethical 
debates. I argue that feminism, as a theoretical field and political practice, has placed the 
female body at its decentred heart (it is of course, on the left). However, as I have 
argued, this body can and must only be understood in its historical materiality [McGrath 
2002: 8]. Moreover, it can only be understood in relation to other bodies. 
From Then to Now 
How then do we move from what is to what ought to be? This is a task of transfonnation 
and a question of ethics. It is a question of the relationship of freedom and obligation. 
This is what Eva Ziarek tenns 'an ethos of becoming and an ethos of alterity' which is 
necessary in order to develop a 'non-appropriative relation to the other' [2001: 2]. 
Similarly, Paul Stoller defines lived experience as, 'one's implication in the life of 
others' [1992: 215]. It is we ourselves who must be responsible and accountable, in the 
present, here and now. 
Moreover, this is a responsibility to those with whom one wishes to communicate and 
the historian, according to Corbin, 'must strive, at the very least, to identify what it is that 
conditions the frontier between the spoken and the unspoken' [Corbin 1995: 190]. Or, we 
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might say, the seen and the unseen. Vision and voice must be given to those archives and 
claimed by those subjects who have until recently remained below the threshold of 
vision. This means rummaging documents and images out of long-forgotten presses; of 
re-arranging temporal sequences; of making connections across various registers. 
In the end, 'the chance of human togetherness, depends on the rights of the stranger, not 
on the question of who - the State of tribe - is entitled to decide who strangers are' 
[Bauman in Werbner 1997: 57]. Bauman draws upon writers such as Levinas who 
constantly remind us that 'with the other our accounts are never settled' [Levinas 1993: 
125]. For Levinas 'the humanity of the human is not to be found in knowledge, but in 
ethics. More important than epistemology, ethics is the demand for morality and justice' 
[see Cohen 2001: 5]. 
Politics and this includes cultural politics, does not, in itself, give meaning. It 'creates or 
refuses conditions of possibility' [Giard in de Certeau 1997: xiv]. Creating such 
conditions, as well as refusing others, is crucial in the present political climate of new 
patriarchies and racisms. The task of a new visual cultural studies is to 'redefine both 
what it is to see and what there is to see' [Latour 1986: 10]. Looking is always an act that 
involves subjects and objects; seeing is historical, and political, social and cultural. We 
need to keep looking, while bearing in mind that vision is embodied; it is always in the 
realm of the senses and therefore our ways of seeing must be linked to our ways of being. 
The final arbiter in any philosophy is of course, not how we think, but what we do 
[Hacking 1983: 31]. 
So, while we consume the products and values of our society through our eyes and ears, 
this is not all that we do. Appadurai contends that the view that 'the mechanical acts of 
reproduction largely reprimed ordinary people for work is far too simple .... there is 
growing evidence that the consumption of mass media throughout the world often 
provokes resistance, irony, selectivity, and, in general, agency' [1996: 7]. How do we 
produce other subjunctive images? These will emerge from the space between how we 
are written by culture and how we want to write, transform, and re-make our culture. 
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Images, and other ways of watching, listening and writing about them are places in 
which we can explore the past in order to allow a different future to come into being. 
Feminist epistemology is a transitional, transformative knowledge which has 
simultaneously resisted and acknowledged what divides us: our human differences, as 
much as our common bonds. It does not aim to eradicate those differences, or to 
assimilate them into a pre-defined norm. Feminism, as Haraway puts it, is about 
interpretation, translation, stuttering and the partly understood [2000: 195 - 6]. It, too, is 
imperfect. However, 'to make connections one needs not knowledge, certainty or even 
ontology, but rather a trust that something may come out, though one is not completely 
sure what' [Rajchman 2000: 7]. 
In a spirit of hope in an age of accelerated transition, of rapidly shifting identities and 
horizons, incompatible ideas have to be kept alive. I would argue that this is what good 
enough, imaginative theories and images do. Imagination, generally seen as something 
childish, is often underestimated. Political imagination is about the power of 
transformation, to conjure up, evoke, to provide spaces in and through which we can 
begin to think not only about ourselves, our own subjectivities, but about the complex 
material and conceptual worlds we inhabit with others. Perhaps as Stoller suggests 'the 
key to doing research in complex transnational spaces devolves less from methods, 
mUltidisciplinary teams or theoretical frameworks - although these are, of course 
important - than from the supplements of the imagination' [1999: 703]. These are the 
spaces in which we all now live, where 'difference is encountered in the adjoining 
neighbourhood [and] the familiar turns Up at the end of the earth' [Clifford 1988: 14]. 
Dan Rose's suggestion is this: 'In terms of the future, our link to the past must be broken 
experientially by reversing our methodological practices. Such reversal would foster 
ethnographies of intimacy, not distance; of stories, not models; of possibilities, not 
stabilities; and of contingent understandings, not detachable conclusions' [1990: 6]. 
I will end then with my own contingent and undetached conclusion. A little over a year 
ago I went to visit the Archives of Glasgow City council, now located in the Mitchell 
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Library. The old part of the library has marble clad walls, gold paint-work, polished 
chequer-board floors, columns, and displays a certain civic pride which is more akin to 
the eastern bloc than the UK. A concierge, still, sits at a desk as one enters; attendants are 
uniformed in city council livery; the water in the toilets is scalding hot. As I stepped 
through the door, I was overwhelmed by the smell, a heady mix of disinfectant (Jeyes) 
and polish (lavender). This potent mix was, is, the smell of civic pride and sanitary 
improvement that I recalled form my childhood. It was a pungent reminder of the ways 
in which history, as Corbin puts it, usually 'comes deoderized' [1996: v]. 
It is a labyrinthine journey to the council archives located on the top floor of the modern 
extension. Here there are carpeted Axminster hallways in swirls of green (catholic) and 
orange (protestant) civic colours and, I found myself thinking only in Glasgow would 
you find a soft drinks machine at the entrance to a manuscript room. Moreover this was 
not sporting not the usual Coca-Cola, but Scotland's national drink, lurid, orange irn-bru; 
made, as the slogan says, from girders, (and hence its bright orange colour: rust). 
All this was odd, but nothing could prepare me for what lay behind the archive doors: 
The place had the appearance of having been recently burgled, chaos reigned; papers 
strewn everywhere, maps, books piled up, desks overflowing - this was the paper 
equivalent of rust: dust. And instead of civic pride this was the space of civic 
disintegration. There were no call slips; one merely wrote down what one wanted to look 
at on a scrap of paper - of which there was an abundance - and handed it to the librarian; 
the computerised catalogue was erratic and probably dated from the days when Atari was 
at the forefront of computer technology. And so, eventually, I ordered photographs, 
letters, pamphlets and then waited and waited; several hours later they arrived, delivered 
by someone who appeared to be an odd-job man, as dishevelled as the archives; a length 
of coarse string hung out his back pocket. Kafka came to mind; maybe this is what an 
archive really should be like, instead of a clean, tidy, air-conditioned and efficiently 
ordered space. 
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I had plenty of time to think and after I got over my irritation of thinking this really is not 
good enough, I realised that here was tangible, material evidence that if history is made, 
it is also unmade and this is not a tidy or clean process. Efficient order conceals, 
represses random disorder, disguising the terrible, awful jumble of papers, pictures, 
objects that make up any archive. It reminded me that history is also a dirty business: 
chaotic and contingent; and that 'the imposition of logic or narrative on history is itself , 
as Joan Scott says, 'a fantasy' [2001: 289]. Archives are eccentric, mad spaces made up 
not only of stuff that was deliberately kept but random bits and pieces. They are places of 
historical absence as much as presence with their warehousing and 'stockpiling of 
fragments that are formed around a nothing' [Kracauer 1993: 431]. It is from such debris 
that we must construct history. 
But perhaps more importantly it made me aware of the sensory aspects of researching. 
Serematakis asks' What happens to the senses when theories haul meaning from social 
institutions to material artefacts and then back again as if the dense and embodied 
communication between persons and things were only a quick exchange between 
surfaces?' [1994: 134]. The body is not a surface (as my experience showed) but is 
penetrated by sounds, smells, memories and history and thought is made not only of 
words, but also of flesh and blood. Photographs, letters are handled and touched, sniffed, 
not just looked at; any experience is an encounter with a picture, alongside it; images 
smell; they conjure sounds; resonate with meanings which penetrate, and can overwhelm 
the body. Feelings are aroused. These sensory qualities are firmly downplayed in 
academic work. 
What happened in Glasgow was a kind of sensory overload that made me both lose the 
place and find another space in which to have second thoughts and mixed feelings. I was 
thrown back on my own resources and reminded that memory is a kind of archive that 
skips time. It is, as Teshome Gabriel says, 'history read backward' [1999: 80]. My 
experience was overwhelming; unmanageable, indeed very frightening. I was not in 
control of my material. Unlike most archives which are dedicated to reassuring the 
researcher that their materials are clean, as if untouched by other hands, methodically 
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accessible, thus relieving them of the burden of his or her own body, this made me all too 
aware of bodies, my own and those others in a long forgotten past. Archives are 
commonly neat spaces where textual volume dominates and the body of the researcher, 
small and insignificant against the vast weight of history, virtually disappears. (Doors are 
usually very heavy, staircases wide, buildings clean). And so, when we make history, we 
do so with our body not just our mind. This is a reciprocal process that means not only 
taking meaning from, but the giving of historical meaning to what has previously been 
rendered inadmissable. And, as Paul Stoller has suggested, history in many non-western 
cultures is 'not a subject or text to be mastered, but a force that consumes the body of 
those who speak it' [1997: xvi]. This is the flip-side of the smooth, seamless world of 
texts and images and authorial voices that acknowledges the overwhelming power of 
history and memory to transfonn the body, as indeed it did my own and, consequently, 
the power of the body to transform history. History begins in the here and now, at home, 
in our own bodies, in our hearts as much as our minds. Perhaps this is a good enough 
place to end and to begin again to create a vital, visual cultural studies in which all has 
not already been said, or perhaps more importantly, done. 
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